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Social media and tech companies face the challenge of identifying and 
removing terrorist and extremist content from their platforms. This paper 
presents the findings of a series of interviews with Global Internet Forum 
to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) partner companies and law enforcement 
Internet Referral Units (IRUs). It offers a unique view on current practices 
and challenges regarding content removal, focusing particularly on 
human-based and automated approaches and the integration of the two.
Summary of Recommendations
• The major technology platforms should begin developing hybrid systems 
(if they have not done so already) for their own and others’ use.
• Technology companies should actively promote the availability, 
effectiveness and transparency of appeal procedures. This includes 
providing to users as full an explanation as possible of why their 
content was removed. 
• The GIFCT shared database of hashes – which focuses on ‘the most 
extreme and egregious terrorist images and videos’1 – should be 
expanded to include more borderline content.
Introduction
In the digital age, counterterrorism involves social media and technology 
companies tackling the spread of terrorist and extremist content on their 
platforms. This engenders lengthy debates around the importance of effective 
and rapid responses to this issue within media, government and the general 
public. This is particularly the case in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks 
such as the Christchurch Mosque shootings in New Zealand. The authors’ 
assumption is that the key to effectiveness lies in the ability to improve 
hybrid human machine decision-making. To do so, however, requires an 
understanding of exactly how judgements to remove or not remove content 
are reached in both systems (human and machine). 
This paper offers insights from in-depth interviews with representatives from 
law enforcement and small- and large-scale tech companies on the subject 
of terrorist and extremist content removal. The interviews aimed to: 
1. Understand how the removal of material for the promotion of 
terrorism is handled. 
2. Examine which criteria are deemed essential to flag content 
as ‘terrorist’. 
1. Facebook Newsroom, ‘Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online Terrorist 
Content’, 5 December 2016, <https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/
partnering-to-help-curb-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/>, accessed  
27 June 2019.
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3. Discern the properties of online content that are used to make the 
remove/not remove decision. 
In effect, the interviews allow the authors to describe current practices 
and challenges in the field, particularly focusing on human-based and 
automated approaches to content removal and the integration thereof. Six 
themes emerged from the interviews and each are elaborated upon in detail 
in this paper. 
1. The two major approaches to content removal.
2. Different types of violating content.
3. The importance of policy guidelines. 
4. The importance of human decision-making. 
5. Differing approaches to measuring accuracy.
6. The problem of ‘grey-zone’ content. 
Thereafter, two discussion points are presented that arose from the identified 
themes and the paper concludes by condensing these findings into three 
policy recommendations. 
Method
GIFCT partner companies and law enforcement based IRUs were approached 
to participate in semi-structured interviews.2 Questions centred around the 
removal procedures of terrorist and extremist content, specifically the division 
between manual and automated decisions for removal. Interview questions 
and an information sheet were sent to interview participants.3 Interviewees 
included company (counterterrorism) policymakers, public policy strategists 
and IRU managers, with seven interviews conducted with nine interviewees. 
Each interview lasted between 20 and 60 minutes, was digitally recorded and 
fully transcribed, and the content was examined qualitatively for recurrent 
themes which are outlined in the introduction. These themes are discussed 
in depth in the following sections.  
The Two Major Approaches to Content Removal
The content-removal process is largely driven by measures focusing on either 
content or behaviour. 
Content-based decisions focus on linguistic characteristics, word use, images, 
and URLs. Behaviour-based decisions look at indicators of the account (for 
2. Interviews were conducted on the understanding that companies and 
interviewees would not be named, and information would not be attributed 
to specific interviewees.
3. Open Science Framework, ‘GIFCT: Terrorist Content Removal’, 23 March 2019, 
<https://osf.io/7jtd2/>, accessed 27 June 2019.
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example, how long ago it was opened, how often it posts messages) or 
message behaviour (for example, including trending or unrelated hashtags) 
independent of the content.
Various social-media companies have hired human content moderators, 
while the larger companies have hired up to several thousand, who manually 
decide whether specific content violates company policies. There is a triaging 
process in place that combines human expertise with automated judgements: 
an automated terrorist content detection system can flag suspect messages 
or accounts for humans to review. Equally, human judgements are fed back 
into automated systems. Within law enforcement, teams of specialists (for 
example, on specific languages and cultures of interest) are also tasked 
with judging pieces of content and referring suspect cases to social-
media companies.
Content-based decisions rely heavily on human involvement. Scaling an 
approach that focuses on content cues is therefore difficult, particularly for 
smaller companies. However, decisions to remove content are sometimes 
also made by other means. One of the interviewed parties likened the 
removal process to spam filtering, where behavioural cues determine 
whether a piece of content or an account is removed. Behavioural cues may 
include abnormal posting volume (for example, several posts per minute), 
or tagging a single post with various trending hashtags to gain attention. 
Such cues can be picked up with relative ease by automated systems, and 
often will not require any human intervention. Indeed, the same interviewee 
raised the point that terrorist and extremist entities exhibit specific online 
behavioural patterns (for example, rapid content release) in an attempt to 
reach a large audience before any systems detect that terrorist propaganda or 
other terrorist content has been posted. This type of behaviour was referred 
to as a ‘raid model’, where an individual opens the account knowing that it 
will be taken down soon, and thus must resort to posting a large amount of 
content in a short time. With a behavioural, content-agnostic approach, an 
account may even be flagged before any content has been posted, because 
its behaviour (such as the accounts it follows) may already resemble spam 
behaviour and suggest a terrorist or extremist entity. 
Different Types of Violating Content 
In 2015, Donald Holbrook demonstrated the broad spectrum of terrorist group 
content.4 At the lower end of the scale, ‘moderate’ content may contain no 
endorsement of violence or hatred towards identified communities. ‘Fringe’ 
content may demonstrate anger and hostility towards a given group of people 
without the added assumption that these people are somehow ‘subhuman’ 
and legitimate targets of violence. In incremental steps, ‘extremist’ content 
4. Donald Holbrook, ‘Designing and Applying an “Extremist Media 
Index”’, Perspectives on Terrorism (Vol. 9, No. 5, 2015), pp. 57–68.
Van der Vegt, Gill, Macdonald, Kleinberg 5
might: glorify general collective violence; glorify violence against specific 
groups; provide facilitation, scope or direction of specific acts of violence 
against specific targets; and provide specific instruction on how to commit 
types of violence. Each provides a challenge for moderation and the threshold 
required for an intervention may differ across companies and jurisdictional 
boundaries. Indeed, some IRUs are mostly concerned with removing 
propaganda that bears the ‘brand’ of a terrorist organisation. In fact, some 
of this content is far from being considered violent. Interviewees also raised 
the importance of monitoring and removing so-called ‘utopian’ content, 
that is, texts, images and videos that praise or glorify extremist lifestyles (for 
example, showing unrealistically peaceful scenes from bombarded regions). 
These forms of propaganda may be as dangerous as graphically violent pieces 
because they may similarly – or possibly more strongly – mobilise people into 
action, as stated by one interviewee. The violent and graphic content often 
associated with terrorist and extremist materials (for example, beheadings) 
may be easiest to judge since there is no question about whether it should be 
taken down. In contrast, veiled propaganda and support is more challenging.
Another example of challenging content relates to the distinction between 
terrorists and political actors. One interviewee mentioned an example where 
a group carried out attacks against infrastructure without the intent to harm 
civilians (by releasing warnings). After deliberation, the company decided not 
to remove that content because it was judged as not meeting their criteria 
for terrorist content. However, since different definitions of terrorism exist, 
other companies may well have opted for removal in such a case, regardless 
of the intent to not harm civilians. 
To summarise, violent images and videos are just one part of a range 
of materials that, in the judgement of social media companies and law 
enforcement organisations, need to be removed. It is equally, if not more, 
important to tackle content that promotes a violent extremist group’s utopian 
ideal or glorifies extremism. This also holds for cases where the (violent) 
intent of a piece of content is purposefully hidden or coded. 
The Importance of Policy Guidelines 
Many law enforcement agencies established their own content moderator 
teams – often designated as IRUs. They flag to social media companies 
pieces of content they find particularly worrying. IRUs do not make the final 
decision on whether content is removed, nor do they enforce their decision. 
Upon receiving such a referral, most platforms will check whether the specific 
instance violates its terms and conditions, leaving open the possibility of 
disagreeing with an IRU’s referral. Indeed, all GIFCT partners have their own 
specific terms of service that bar terrorist entities from a presence on their 
platform, and similarly will not allow individual users to praise, support or 
represent such organisations.
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Implementing such policy guidelines on smaller platforms is equally, if not 
more, important. In the past, there have been instances of smaller platforms 
being confronted with an influx of terrorist users once the platform had been 
identified as an easy or convenient target for spreading content. Content is 
only removed from platforms if it violates policy guidelines, even if it has 
been flagged by law enforcement agencies. Therefore, it seems important 
that technology companies have comprehensive terms of service in place to 
counter a wide range of terrorist and extremist content. 
The Importance of Human Decision-Making
All interviewees reported that a human element is integral to their 
decision-making process. In fact, most smaller platforms reported not using 
any form of automation. Human moderators are often tasked with examining 
‘grey zone’ content, where materials may be judged by several people before 
a decision is made, or where a team of moderators and/or policymakers will 
discuss what type of action should be taken. Human moderators are also 
needed to judge the context surrounding pieces of terrorist and extremist 
content. Some pieces of content may, for example, appear in a journalistic 
context, where a news organisation is factually reporting on a piece of 
content, condemning it, or sharing (parts of) it to undermine it. 
Other contextual nuances, such as cultural and political specificity, coded 
language, humour, satire, and irony are also better judged by humans, 
often with specialist knowledge on the topic, language, cultural or political 
situation. This, for example, includes understanding new emerging groups, 
but also distinguishing between content relating to a military conflict versus 
a terrorist attack. 
A common assertion made by interviewees about human content moderators 
was that they are domain experts (for example, with professional expertise 
in counterterrorism), linguists (for example, those who understand 
highly localised language), and area experts (for example, those who are 
aware of the groups operating in a small geographical region and have 
on-the-ground knowledge). Another reason interviewees identified for relying 
on human expertise is the ability to identify ‘adversarial shifts’, where groups 
change their modus operandi or the targeted platform. Such shifts in the 
content-spreading strategies of terrorist groups prove problematic. As 
mentioned by one of the interviewees, in a smaller-scale operation automated 
systems take longer to develop due to limited resources. In addition, due to 
adversarial shifts such systems may lose their relevance once implemented 
and once personnel are trained in their use.
It is important to note that automated content-removal efforts were 
predominantly used by the larger social media platforms and not by IRUs 
or small platforms. Smaller platforms resorted to manual approaches to 
collect suspect content and remove it – often as a judgement call or after 
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flagging from other platform users. A possible reason is the number of 
resources needed to establish engineering teams that build automated 
content-removal systems. When automated systems were in place, one of the 
interviewed parties emphasised the importance of an appeal process. The 
appeals process, in general, includes the option of a user raising concerns about 
the blocking of their account or the removal of (some of) their posted content. 
When removal decisions are challenged, they are reviewed by human experts. 
One desirable effect that one of the companies hopes to achieve with the 
appeal process is handling false-positive decisions in a less restrictive manner.
All in all, human decision-making remains integral to every platform whose 
representatives were interviewed. Multiple interviewees stated that human 
expertise trumps automated systems in instances where expert knowledge 
is necessary. In some cases, human moderation was the sole system in place. 
Where automated systems are used, mostly in large-scale operations, the 
importance of an adequate appeal process was emphasised, so that potential 
false positives can be re-reviewed. 
Differing Approaches to Measuring Accuracy
A recurrent theme in the public discourse about content removal is that 
of removal accuracy. Indeed, an interviewee from one of the large-scale 
companies that makes use of automated systems stressed the importance 
of reaching removal accuracy rates ‘as close to 100%’ as possible. However, 
there seems to be no consensus in the field as to how this accuracy can 
most effectively be measured. One option that was raised by two different 
interviewees is examining the appeals rate, where the number of successful 
appeals (false positives) may reflect the quality of the removal system. 
Another route mentioned by an interviewee involves internally reviewing 
content, where human moderators from different levels of expertise 
re-label a random sample of content that was taken down. Furthermore, it was 
also mentioned by one interviewed party that automated systems can be used 
to carry out more fine-grained photo- and video-matching, which can produce 
a figure of how accurate the matching process is. For IRUs, accuracy rates can 
be measured in terms of the rate of flagged content that is actually taken down 
by social-media companies. Regarding this, one IRU manager estimated that 
99% of the content that is referred to social-media companies by the unit is 
indeed removed. All in all, no standardised measure of estimating accuracy in 
terrorist and extremist content removal emerged from the interviews.
The Problem of ‘Grey-Zone’ Content
Many interviewees raised the problem of the judgement ‘grey zone’, which 
refers to those cases where content is not obviously terrorist content but 
not clearly innocent either. For example, one interviewee described these 
cases as ones that would be considered ‘uncomfortable’ or ‘bad speech that 
is not bad enough to meet the takedown’. For these cases, in particular, the 
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low base rate of actual terrorist content presents a dilemma: with a high 
chance for false positive decisions, the removal of grey-zone content can 
be interpreted as over-censorship. Conversely, if some consider grey-zone 
content to be terrorist content, failure to remove it might result in public 
outcry and alleged violations of the ‘Nine Steps’ that leading social media 
companies pledged to implement in response to the Christchurch Call.5 
Several interviewees reported that they err on the side of freedom of speech 
rather than over-censorship. That effectively means that the problem is 
currently solved by not removing doubtful cases. While that decision does 
lower the false positive rate, it may also be perceived as an increase in false 
negatives (in other words, terrorist content that is not removed). 
Discussion
The preceding sections outline current practices in terrorist and extremist 
content removal, as well as common challenges faced within the field. The 
issues identified in this research give rise to two discussion points, which are 
condensed into policy recommendations in the conclusion. 
First, it is worthwhile considering the argument that highly accurate automated 
tools will solve the problem. Indeed, an interviewee from a large-scale company 
stated that only highly accurate (close to 100% accuracy rates) systems are put 
into place. Even if such accuracy rates are a possibility, problems with false 
positives and negatives will persist. A popular misperception is that as soon as 
the content-removal systems become more accurate, human expertise becomes 
obsolete and the problem will disappear. Consider an example of a company 
that took down 1 million pieces of what it deemed to be terrorist content. 
Suppose automated systems identify terrorist content with 95% accuracy and 
identify unproblematic content with the same accuracy. Intuitively, one would 
concur that if a piece of content is removed, the chances that this was indeed 
terrorist content are 95%. But this is far from correct because of a statistical 
catch. Since most content is non-terrorist (for the sake of simplicity, assume 
1% of content is terrorist), the relatively small error rate of 5% still amounts to 
an enormous absolute number. 
Under the assumption that a large social-media company deals with 100 
million pieces of content in a given period, three important calculations can 
be made: 1) it is known that there are 1 million pieces of actual terrorist 
content in the sample (1%); 2) with a 95% accuracy rate, 950,000 pieces 
of actual terrorist content will be accurately identified (true positives), and 
50,000 pieces will not be recognised (false negatives); and 3) of the 99 million 
normal content pieces, 4.95 million (5%) are still falsely identified as terrorist 
content (false positives), and 94.05 million will be correctly identified as 
5. See Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter, ‘Joint Statement in Support 
of Christchurch Call’, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/wp-content/uploads/prod/
sites/5/2019/05/Christchurch-Call-and-Nine-Steps.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2019.
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non-terrorist (true negatives).6 In short, 5.9 million pieces in total will be 
flagged as terrorist content (false positives + true positives = 4.95 million + 
950,000). This means that if a piece of content was removed, the chances 
that it was in fact terrorist content are merely 16.10% (true positives/false 
positives + true positives = 950,000/5.9 million). This base rate fallacy renders 
the task of content removal highly challenging: even with outstanding 
accuracy rates, companies will by the very nature of the problem end up 
removing mainly innocent content. Added to that problem is the difficulty 
of measuring accuracy in the first place, where different companies have 
different understandings of true and false positives and negatives.
Second, when it comes to grey-zone content, the solution might not lie solely 
in automated approaches because of the nuances and context that create the 
grey-zone problem in the first place. Rather, it might simply be that this issue 
cannot currently be addressed. This is partly because its difficulty might have 
been underestimated, and partly because the ability of tech companies to 
solve it might have been overestimated. However, this is mostly because the 
problem by definition is not solvable to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. 
Government, law enforcement, tech companies and the general public may 
all have different interests and standards when it comes to extremist content 
removal. Moreover, different stakeholders abide by different definitions of 
terrorism. Similarly, law enforcement bodies may use different definitions 
depending on the law of the state in which they are located. 
Instead, what is needed is research into collaborative decision-making 
processes that more effectively combine multiple layers of automated 
content moderation (for example, content-based approaches and behavioural 
approaches) and human expertise. A cascaded approach could be implemented, 
whereby each layer narrows down the number of content pieces that need to 
be further assessed for containing terrorist content. Ideally, there remains in 
the last layer of the automated cascade only a small proportion of the content 
(for example, those in the ‘grey zone’) to be reviewed by human moderators. 
However, the indicators for each layer of the assessment procedure need to be 
independent of (in other words, uncorrelated with) each other, in order to not 
propagate false positive and false negative rates. In short, if decision-making 
strategies that signal terrorist content independently from one another were 
to be found (for example, two cues that signal terrorist content in different 
ways), collaborative cascaded decision-making approaches might offer a path 
towards better online regulation. 
6. Note that the accuracy rate of 95% can then be re-calculated as follows: 
(950,000 + 94.05 million)/(95,000 + 94.05 million + 4.95 million + 50,000) 
= (true positives + true negatives) / (true positives + true negatives + false 
positives + false negatives) = 0.95.
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Recommendations
This paper offers a view on various approaches to extremist and terrorist 
online content removal. Through interviews with representatives of leading 
technology companies and law enforcement agencies, the authors have shed 
light on current practices in this field. More importantly, the interviews have 
enabled the authors to identify avenues for future research and suggestions 
for industry improvement. From an analysis of the interviews, the authors 
propose three policy recommendations:
1. The problems of contextual ambiguity and grey-zone decisions remain 
issues that need to be addressed through effective hybrid systems, 
integrating both human and automated content moderation, where 
collaborative, cascaded decision-making systems combine independent 
indicators. The major technology platforms should begin developing 
hybrid systems (if they have not done so already) for their own 
and others’ use.
2. Due to the base rate fallacy, even highly accurate systems are faced 
with the problem of false positives. Therefore, straightforward appeal 
processes are a necessary safeguard. Moreover, the opportunity to 
appeal should be a meaningful one. Technology companies should 
actively promote the availability, effectiveness and transparency 
of appeal procedures. This includes providing to users as full an 
explanation as possible of why their content was removed. 
3. Specialist knowledge is required to understand the nuances of much 
extremist (and borderline) content. Such knowledge may not always be 
in place, especially within smaller companies, meaning false positives 
and false negatives are more likely. Collaboration between large- and 
small-scale tech companies is therefore essential. Knowledge-sharing 
will improve the ability of companies with fewer resources to effectively 
counter terrorist and extremist presence on their platforms. To this 
end, the GIFCT shared database of hashes – which focuses on ‘the 
most extreme and egregious terrorist images and videos’7 – should be 
expanded to include this more borderline content.
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